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Abstract 
This paper presents an overview and assessment of the theoretical 
and  empirical  work  on  catch-up  and  growth,  with  particular  emphasis 
on the impact of technology, and the consequences for developing 
countries. The point of departure is the neoclassical theory of 
economic growth, as laid out by Solow and other in the 1950s, and 
the applied work that followed ("growth accounting"). Then the 
contributions  from  economic  historians  and  more  heterodox 
economists, such as Schumpeter, Kaldor and others, are discussed, 
followed by an account of the most recent theoretical developments 
in this area ("new growth theory"). Finally an assessment is made 
of the lessons from the recent surge in empirical (econometric) 
work in this area. 
 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Joseph A. Schumpeter 
Society  1992  Conference,  19-22  August,  Kyoto,  Japan.  I  want  to  thank  the 
commentator,  Karl  Heinrich  Oppenländer,  and  the  other  participants  at  the  session 
for comments and suggestions. The revision of the paper has also benefited from 
my recent work in this area, whether under single authorship (Fagerberg 1994) 
or together with Nick non Tunzelmann and Bart Verspagen (Fagerberg et al. 1994). 
I am grateful to Nick and Bart for allowing me to draw on our joint work.    
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Introduction 
 
To what extent may technologically and economically less advanced 
countries be expected to catch up with the most advanced ones (and, 
hence, display faster growth)? This has been one of the central 
issues in theoretical and applied work on growth for a long time. 
It was introduced by economic historians (Gerschenkrohn 1962), who 
pointed to the potential advantages accruing to backward countries 
from imitating the technologically and economically more advanced 
ones. Empirical work on post war growth in the OECD area seemed 
to confirm these expectations. However, recent research has thrown 
doubts  on  whether  these  experiences  are  valid  for  other  time  periods 
and countries, in particular the developing ones. 
  The empirical support found in earlier studies for catching 
up  or  convergence  was  comforting  news  for  the  established 
neoclassical  theory  of  growth  (Solow  1956,  1957),  which  -  on  certain 
assumptions -  predicts this outcome. In this theory technology 
was assumed to be a public good, freely available for everyone 
without  charge,  and  technological  progress  was  assumed  to  be 
exogenous.  Similarly,  the  contradictory  findings  of  the  more  recent 
literature have been used by critics of the established theory, 
in  particular  the  adherents  of  the  so-called  "new  growth  theories", 
where technological progress is assumed to depend on economic 
activities  (i.e.,  endogenous).  This  debate  has  also  led  to  increased 
interest in the works of non-orthodox economists, particularly 
those  of  Schumpeter  and  Kaldor,  and  to  a  rapidly  increasing 
empirical  literature  on  differences  in  growth  across  countries  with  
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varying levels of development. 
  This  paper  presents  an  overview  and  assessment  of  the 
theoretical  and  empirical  work  on  catch-up  and  growth,  with 
particular  emphasis  on  the  impact  of  technology,  and  the 
consequences for developing countries. The point of departure is 
the neoclassical theory of economic growth, as laid out by Solow 
and other in the 1950s, and the applied work that followed ("growth 
accounting"). Then the contributions from economic historians and 
more heterodox economists, such as Schumpeter, Kaldor and others, 
are  discussed,  followed  by  an  account  of  the  most  recent  theoretical 
developments  in  this  area  ("new  growth  theory").  Finally  an 
assessment  is  made  of  the  lessons  from  the  recent  surge  in  empirical 
(econometric) work in this area. 
    
Traditional Growth Theory   
 
It  was  neoclassical  economists  that  brought  technological  progress 
to the forefront as an explanatory factor of economic growth, 
although  this  was  not  their  original  intention.  The  model  suggested 
by Solow (1956) was based on standard neoclassical assumptions, 
such  as  perfect  competition  (and  information),  maximizing 
behaviour,  no  externalities,  positive  and  decreasing  marginal 
productivities, production function homogeneous of degree one etc. 
On the assumptions of a given rate of population growth and a given 
savings rate
1, the model was shown to yield a long -run equilibrium 
                     
1  This  was  Solow's  assumption.  Alternatively,  one  may  assume  inter-temporal 
utility  maximization,  in  which  case  the  discount  factor  for  future  versus  present 
consumption must be exogenously determined. This is of no importance here.  
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with gross domestic product and the capital stock growing at the 
exogenously determined rate of population growth. Hence, on these 
assumptions there can be no growth in GDP per capita in the long 
run.
2 
  It was at this point that technological progress came into 
play. To allow for long -run growth in GDP per capita, Solow added  
an exogenous term, labelled "technological progress", which among 
else was assumed to reflect advances in basic science.  In this 
perspective, technology is a "free" good, i.e., something that is 
accessible for everybody free of charge. Although Solow did  not 
discuss the implications of this for a multi -country world, it was 
taken for granted in the applied work that followed that this means 
that the contribution of technological progress to economic growth 
must be the same all over the world. Hence, in th e long run, GDP 
per capita should be expected to grow at the same rate in all 
countries.  
   However,  since  initial  conditions  generally  differ, 
countries may grow at different rates in the process towards 
long-run equilibrium (so-called "transitional dynamics"). A case 
can be made, then, for poor countries growing faster than the richer 
ones: countries where capital is scarce compared to labour (i.e., 
where the capital labour ratio is low) should be expected to have 
a higher rate of profit on capital, a hig her rate of capital 
accumulation and, hence, higher per capita growth. To the extent 
                     
2  This  result  follows  from  the  standard  neoclassical  assumption  of  decreasing 
returns. Technically, this result could be avoided if a functional form that imposes 
a  lower,  positive  limit  for  the  marginal  productivity  of  capital  is  chosen  (Solow 
1956,  Pitchford  1960).  However,  this  possibility  did  not  attract  much  attention, 
probably because an economic justification was hard to find.  
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that capital is internationally mobile, this tendency should be 
much strengthened. Thus, the gaps in income levels between rich 
and poor countries should be expected to narrow (catch-up) and 
ultimately disappear. This conclusion holds as long as savings 
rates,  or  more  generally  the  factors  affecting  savings,  are 
identical  across  countries.
3  If not, countries will approach 
different steady states, but (per capita) growth rates will still 
converge. 
  It was pointed out by several authors that Solow's model 
overlooks that new technology is usually embodied in new capital 
goods. If this assumption is introduced in neoclassical growth 
models (so-called vintage models, Johansen 1959; Solow 1960 and 
Nelson 1964, among others), the importance of capital accumulation 
in the process towards long-run equilibrium is increased. But as 
long as the other assumptions of the Solow model are left unchanged, 
the conclusion that in the absence of technological progress there 
will be no productivity growth in the long run, remains the same. 
A more radical departure from the  Solow assumptions may be found 
in Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) and Arrow (1962). They present vintage 
models  of  economic  growth  where  technological  progress  is 
endogenized as "learning by doing" in the capital -goods industry. 
This class of models may in prin ciple  allow for long-run growth 
(see the section on "New Growth Theory"). However, as pointed out 
by Arrow, this perspective, as well as that of Solow, fails to take 
into account the part of technological progress that comes through 
                     
3  Strictly  speaking,  full  convergence  also  requires  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  the 
labour force is the same across countries.  
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R&D investments in private firms. Attempts to introduce this by 
presenting models with a separate technology-producing sector were 
made by Uzawa (1965), Phelps (1966), Shell (1967) and others. 
However, by the early 1970s, growth theory had gone out of fashion 
and with it the idea of endogenous technological progress. As a 
consequence,  these  models  had  little,  if  any,  impact  on  the 





From  the  late  1950s  onwards  empirical  research  on  factors  affecting 
long-run growth grew steadily. Much in the same way as the post 
war work on national accounts decomposed GDP into its constituent 
parts, the empirical research on growth attempted to decompose 
growth  of  GDP  (so-called  "growth  accounting",  for  surveys  see  Nadiri 
1970; Maddison 1987). Although some of this work actually preceded 
the  formal  models,  Solow's  growth  theory  gave  a  natural  theoretical 
framework for these exercises.  
  The  Solow  model  predicts  that  apart  from  exogenous 
technological progress, GDP growth (y) will be a weighted sum of 
the growth in physical capital (k) and the growth of the labour 
force (n), with the shares of capital and labour in national income 
(sK and sL) as weights:  
 
(1) y = sKk + sLn 
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If  the  functional  distribution  of  income,  the  growth  of  the  capital 
stock and the growth of the labour force are known, equation (1) 
could be used to calculate the contribution of capital and labour 
to economic growth. What was left when these contributions were 
deducted, the residual, would then be assumed to reflect exogenous 
technological progress and other unidentified sources. When this 
model was applied to empirical data for the US, several studies 
showed that growth of capital and labour explained only a small 
part of actual growth (Abramowitz 1956; Solow 1957; Kendrick 1961; 
Denison 1962). The residual turned out to be surprisingly large. 
Two avenues were followed for "squeezing down the residual" as 
Nelson (1981) puts it. One was to embody, as much as possible, 
technological progress into the factors themselves by adjusting 
for shifts in quality, composition etc (Denison 1962; Jorgensen 
and Griliches 1967).
4 Another, later dominant, approach in this 
literature, was to add other possible explanatory variables 
(Denison 1962, 1967).  
  Empirical analyses of differences in growth across countries 
based on this latter methodology have been undertaken by Denison 
(1967), Denison and Chung (1976), Kendrick (1981) and Maddison 
(1987). The additional factors taken into account range from 
differences in the scope for "catch -up" to differences in the degree 
of governmental regulation and crime. These studies show that it 
is possible to "explain" a larger part of the actual differences 
in growth across countries by introducing additional explanatory 
                     
4  J orgensen  and  Griliches  initially  argued  that  the  residual  could  be  eliminated 
altogether,  but  later  retreated  from  that  position.  See  Denison  (1969)  and 
J orgensen and Griliches (1972).  
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variables.
5 However, it has been pointed out that the theoretical 
basis for the whole exercise is questionable, since it is not taken 
into account  that many of these variables are in fact interdependent 
(Nelson 1964, 1973, 1981). This holds not only for the additional 
factors introduced by Denison and others, but also for the relation 
between technological progress and factor growth.
6 It follows that 
it may be difficult to discuss questions related to causality within 
this framework. 
  An example may illustrate this point. In the 1950s, Western 
Europe grew much more rapidly than the USA. Many would probably 
expect diffusion of technology from the USA to Western Europe 
(imitation) to have played an important role in this process (see 
the next section). However, Denison (1967) argues that this was 
not the case. Instead  he points to other factors, among them 
structural changes and exploitation of economies of scale; to a 
large extent these are said to be related to the rapid growth of 
European consumer durables industries during this period. The 
obvious counter-argument would be: Where did the technological and 
social conditions for the rapidly growing consumer durables 
                     
5  However,  much  of  the  variation  in  the  data  continues  to  be  unexplained. 
Maddison  (1987)  presents  a  growth-accounting  study  based  on  Denison's 
methodology for six  OECD  countries  between  1913  and  1984.  Fourteen  different 
explanatory variables were taken into account. Still, the part of actual growth that 
can be explained in this way does not on average exceed 75 %. For some countries 
in some periods it is not more than 50-60%. 
6  Several autho rs have suggested that technological progress and accumulation of 
physical and/or human capital interact, so that the contribution of each factor is 
not easily defined. For example, technological progress may take the form of 
"learning from using" the exis ting machinery and equipment, as suggested by 
Arrow, Kaldor and others, or technological progress may be "biased" towards 
physical or human capital (in contrast to what is normally assumed in growth 
theory) as suggested by, for instance, Abramovitz and Dav id (1973). I discuss this 
in somewhat more detail in Fagerberg (1994).   
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industries first develop, if not in the USA? How to decide which 
argument  to  trust?  The  problem  is  that  there  are  several  interacting 
variables, and without a theory that takes this properly into 





The "catch-up" or "imitation" argument is not identical to the 
neoclassical case of "transitional dynamics", although the two 
arguments may yield identical growth predictions. The "catch-up" 
argument,  developed  by  Gerschenkrohn  (1962),  Gomulka  (1971), 
Abramowitz (1979, 1986, 1994a,b), Maddison (1979, 1982, 1991) and 
others,  puts  its  emphasis  on  differences  in  the  scope  for  imitation. 
Countries behind the world innovation frontier, it is argued, can 
grow  faster  by  copying  technologies  already  developed  in 
technologically more advanced economies. In the neoclassical case 
of "transitional dynamics", on the other hand, the main vehicle 
for growth differences is differences in profitability and, hence, 
capital  accumulation,  not  technological  differences.  However,  both 
perspectives imply that economic growth should be expected to be 
negatively  correlated  with  the  level  of  GDP  per  capita.  The 
interpretation  of  this  indicator  differs,  though.  In  the  "catch-up" 
literature, GDP per capita is assumed to reflect the degree of 
technological sophistication of the country, in the neoclassical 
story it is a proxy for the capital-labour ratio. 
  Much  of  the  "catch-up"  literature  is  descriptive,  with  a  strong  
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emphasis on historical analysis. In addition to economic factors, 
especially  investments  in  physical  and  human  capital,  this 
literature emphasizes the importance of social and institutional 
factors for the outcome of the "catch-up" process. Thus, catch up 
is by no means automatic: " a country's potential for rapid growth 
is  not  strong  when  it  is  backward  without  qualification,  but  rather 
when  it  is  technologically  backward  but  socially  advanced" 
(Abramovitz  1986,  p.  388).  Abramovitz,  following  Ohkawa  and 
Rosovsky (1973), has used the concept "social capability" to cover 
some of the latter. In a recent paper he defines this concept as 
follows: 
  "... it is a rubric that covers contries' levels of general 
education  and  technical  competence,  the  commercial, 
industrial  and  financial  institutions  that  bear  on  their 
abilities  to  finance  and  operate  modern,  large-scale  business, 
and the political and social characteristics that influence 
the  risks,  the  incentives  and  the  personal  rewards  of  economic 
activity including those rewards in social esteem that go 
beyond money and wealth." (Abramovitz 1994b, p.25) 
He  also  points  out  that  since  technologies  are  shaped  by  the 
environment  in  which they develop, a country that differs much from 
the technological leader in factor supply, market size etc. may 
sometimes find it difficult to absorb leader country technology 
(so-called  lack  of  "technological  congruence",  see  Abramovitz 
1994a,b).  For  instance,  the  failure  of  most  industrialized 
countries to catch up with the US prior to the Second World War 
has been explained in this way (Abramovitz 1994a, b; Nelson and  
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Wright 1992).
7    
  Thus, although this is not always made explicit, authors in 
this tradition view technology quite differently from the followers 
of Solow. For instance, to the extent that innovation i s taken in 
to consideration, it is seen as highly dependent on interaction 
between firms and their environments. This puts a context -specific 
stamp on technology and may hamper diffusion to other settings (cf. 
for instance Abramovitz's analysis of "technol ogical congruence"). 
Some extend this perspective to include the national level, e.g., 
"national systems of innovation" (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). A 
consequence of this perspective, i.e., the interdependence between 
technology and other factors, is - as already emphasized - that 
technological catch up is far from easy. It requires a host of 
supporting economic and institutional factors to succeed.  
  Still, when it comes to statistical tests, most "catch-up" 
studies include one independent variable only:  GDP per capita (as 
a proxy for the scope for "catch-up").  Several studies of this 
type, including Singer and Reynolds (1975), Abramovitz (1979, 
1986), Maddison (1979, 1982, 1991) and Baumol (1986), have shown 
that a large part of the actual difference in  growth rates between 
the OECD countries in the post war period can be statistically 
explained by differences in the scope for "catch -up". This result 
                     
7  US technology, these authors argue, were capital-, resource- and scale-intensive. 
To  make  sense  economically,  these  technologies  required  a  large,  homogenous 
market.  The  European  countries  (and  even  more  so,  J apan)  had  less  n atural 
resources,  much  smaller  markets,  demand  was  less  homogenous  etc.  These 
problems  were  enforced  by  the  low  growth  and  increasing  protectionism  of  the 
interwar  period.  However,  after  the  Second  Word  War,  these  constraints  were 
relaxed, and this resulted - according to these authors - in a very rapid catch-up 
process.  
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has been criticized by De Long (1988) as an example of a "ex post 
selection bias": while long-run convergence can be established for 
the richest countries today (the OECD countries), it does not hold 
for the richest countries of the previous century. Similarly, 
several studies, including Baumol et al. (1989), Skonhoft (1989) 
and Barro (1991), have shown that a simple "catch-up" model has 
little  explanatory  power  for  the  performance  of  the  poorest 
countries of the world. 
  Thus, the "catch-up" debate has a very clear conclusion: a 
simple  "catch-up"  model  with  one  independent  variable  is  not 
sufficient to explain differences in growth. This would probably 
not surprise the group of economic historians who initiated much 
of  this  work,  their  emphasis  on  other  economic,  social  and 
institutional factors taken into account. The idea of technology 
as a "free good" has probably never been very appealing for someone 
well acquainted with modern economic history.  
  However,  the  basic  question  remains:  Which  additional 
variables to choose? This is not an innocent question, at least 
not if the common practice of including a large number of variables 
in  an  ad  hoc  (and  to  some  extent  arbitrary)  manner  is  to  be  avoided. 
The  following  discusses  some  theoretical  and  empirical 




The  Schumpeterian  approach  is  deeply  influenced  by  classical 
economic thinking. Indeed, as Schumpeter himself recognized, the  
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model of growth based on technological competition (innovation and 
diffusion  of  technology)  was  initially  formulated  by  Marx. 
Basically, what this model suggests is that both innovation and 
"catch-up" (imitation) are conducive to growth. However, while it 
may be possible to "catch up" by mainly imitating activities, it 
is  not  possible  to  surpass  the  technological  leaders  without  passing 
them in innovative activity as well. Thus, in principle at least, 
the  Schumpeterian  framework  allows  for  both  divergence  and 
convergence.  
  Even though the Marx-Schumpeter model is a model of the firm, 
it is tempting to apply the model at a more aggregated level, i.e., 
as a model for the growth of countries. The first attempt to do 
so was made by Pavitt and Soete (1982), but the empirical results 
presented there were ambiguous. Fagerberg (1987, 1988a, 1991) has 
presented a simple model where growth depends on (1) the growth 
of  knowledge,  whether  diffused  to  the  country  from  abroad  or  created 
within  the  country  itself,  and  (2)  efforts  to  exploit  the  available 
knowledge,  wherever  created.  The  tested  model  included  three 
variables:  the  scope  for  exploitation  of  foreign-produced  knowledge 
(proxied  by  GDP  per  capita),  growth  in  national  innovative  activity 
(proxied  by  growth  in  patents)  and  efforts  (proxied  by  investments). 
All three variables contributed significantly to the explanation 
of the observed differences in growth in a sample of developed and 
newly industrializing countries. It was concluded that "to catch 
up  with  the  developed  countries,  ...  semi-industrialized countries 
cannot  rely  only  on  a  combination  of  technology  imports  and 
investments, but have to increase their national technological  
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activities as well" (Fagerberg 1988a, p. 451). 
  Verspagen (1991) has introduced some of these ideas into a 
non-linear framework, and tested the resulting model on a sample 
of  more  than  one  hundred  countries,  including  many  developing  ones. 
Basically what this model suggests is that countries characterized 
by  a  large  technological  gap  and  a  low  "social  capability" 
(education  level)  run  the  risk  of  being  caught  in  a  low-growth  trap. 
In addition to the technological gap and the education level, the 
tested equation also included equipment investments and the level 
of innovative activity (measured by patents). It was shown that 
this non-linear model has a higher explanatory power than simple 
linear relationships of the type considered by either Pavitt and 
Soete  or  Fagerberg.  However,  this  result  was  not  confirmed  by  Amable 
(1993), who applied the same type of model to a somewhat smaller 
sample. 
  Amable  (1993)  presents  a  (linear)  catch-up  model  where  several 
of  the  conditioning  factors  are  endogenized.  Catch  up  is  conditioned 
by equipment investment, the level of education and the share of 
governmental  expenditure  in  GDP.  Investment  is  endogenous  and 
depends  on  growth  (the  accelerator),  the  level  of  innovative 
activity (as measured by patents) and the share of governmental 
expenditure in GDP. Innovative activity is also made endogenous 
in the model (assumed to depend on the level of education). This 
model may allow for both converging and diverging growth paths. 
The results, based on data for 59 countries between 1960 and 1985, 
suggest that only a minority of the countries (around one-fifth) 
will catch up completely. Most countries will converge towards a  
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level well below the most advanced countries, while some will be 





Arguing  along  "Keynesian"  or  "Post-Keynesian"  lines  several  authors 
have presented models and analyses where structural differences 
across countries may lead to long-run differences in growth rates. 
The origins of this work can be traced back to Harrod's and Hicks's 
early  attempts  to  develop  a  Keynesian  understanding  of  open-economy 
macroeconomics,  in  which  the  growth  of  a  country  was  seen  as 
constrained  by  the  demand  for  its  exports.  However,  the  main 
contributor  and  source of inspiration in this area has been Kaldor. 
  In the 1950s Kaldor developed models of economic growth in 
which technological progress was assumed to be endogenous (the 
technological progress function, see Kaldor 1957, 1961 and Kaldor 
and  Mirrlees  1962).  The  basic  idea  was  that  investment  and  learning 
were  interrelated,  so  that  technological  progress  could  be  modelled 
as a function of capital accumulation per worker. These models 
contained only one production sector and structural aspects were 
therefore  not  taken  into  consideration.  In  his  applied  work, 
however,  he  was  at  pains  to  stress  that  the  prospects  for 
technological  progress  were  not  equal  across  sectors  or  industries. 
Generally these prospects were assumed to be more favourable in 
manufacturing  than  elsewhere  (Kaldor  1966,  1967),  giving 
manufacturing  the role as an "engine of growth" in the economy. 
                     
8  This section draws on Fagerberg et al. (1994).  
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Following  Verdoorn  (1949),  Kaldor  saw  productivity  growth  in 
manufacturing as related to growth of manufacturing output, e.g., 
the higher the rate of growth of manufacturing output, the higher 
the rate of learning, and hence the rate of productivity growth. 
 He also noted the interaction between the growth of manufacturing 
and  demand:  since  income  elasticities  of  demand  vary  across  produc-
tion sectors, rising national income will (in a closed economy) 
go  hand  in  hand  with  structural  changes  in  the  composition  of  output, 
a theme later elaborated by Pasinetti (1981). However, export 
markets may allow a country to change – and grow – at a faster rate 
than the domestic markets would have allowed. Thus, for Kaldor 
growth  of  manufacturing  exports  was  one  of  the  chief  ways  to  increase 
manufacturing output and, hence, learning, technological progress 
and the competitiveness of a country (Kaldor 1978, 1981). 
  Kaldor  often  stressed  the  interactive  character  of  the  factors 
taking  part  in  the  growth  process,  leading  to  "cumulative  causation" 
or "virtuous" and "vicious" patterns of development.
9 In a paper 
from 1970, devoted to the issue of why growth rates  of countries 
– and regions – differ, Kaldor sketched an approach which combined 
the Keynesian assumption of growth as constrained by export demand 
with his own emphasis on endogenous technological progress. This 
approach was later formalized by Dixon and Thirlwall (1975). In 
this model the impact of growth in export demand on economic growth 
through  the  multiplier  is  magnified  by  the  Kaldor–Verdoorn 
relationship:  the  increase in demand induced by export growth 
affects productivity positively, this leads to improvements in the 
                     
9  This idea is often attributed to Myrdal (1957).  
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price competitiveness for exports (assuming wages constant), and, 
hence, further increases in the rates of growth in exports and GDP. 
The most likely outcome (according to Dixon and Thirlwall) would 
be  one  of  countries  growing  at  different  rates  –  reflecting 
differences in structural characteristics – implying divergence 
rather than convergence in productivity levels.  
  Thirlwall  (1979)  introduced  a  constraint  on  the  external 
account  into  this  framework  (balanced  trade),  arguing  that 
export-led growth models may otherwise overestimate growth. On the 
additional assumption that relative prices are relatively sticky, 
so that their impact can be ignored (eliminating the feedback from 
endogenous  technological  progress),  Thirlwall  showed  that  the 
growth rate of a country's GDP relative to the rest of the world 
depends on the relation between the demand elasticities for its 
exports and imports, i.e., on structural aspects of the economy. 
This means that a country that produces goods which are in high 
demand both at home and abroad will grow faster. Thirlwall (1979) 
showed  that  with  the  exception  of  Japan  this  simple  model 
"explained" postwar growth remarkably well. But these results, 
although highly suggestive, have been subject to some controversy 
(for an overview see McCombie 1986).    
  A  pertinent  question  is  what  the  estimates  (of  income 
elasticities of demand) that Thirlwall used really reflect. The 
concept "income elasticity of demand" makes sense for products, 
but it is intuitively more difficult to see how it can be applied 
to the total exports or imports of a country. It may simply be, 
as Thirlwall himself points out, that these estimates reflect the  
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impact  of  so-called  "non-price"  factors  on  competitiveness.   
Kaldor (1981, p. 603) suggested that these elasticities should be 
seen  as  shorthand  for  "the  innovative  ability  and  adaptive  capacity" 
of the producers in the different countries. Following this Fager-
berg (1988b) presented a balance-of-payments constrained growth 
model where exports and imports were determined by the differences 
across  countries  in  the  potential  for  catch-up,  indigenous 
technological efforts, investments and other factors. This model 
presented a possible explanation of the finding of Kaldor (1978) 
that the market shares for exports for countries seem to move in 
line with relative costs (and not the other way around).
10 
   The Kaldorian perspective on "why growth rates differ" rests 
on three assumptions: (a) endogenous technological progress (in 
the form of learning by doing), (b) differences in the prospects 
for technological progress across industries and sectors and (c) 
differences in income-elasticities of demand across products and 
markets. A fully adequate  formalisation of this perspective would 
require a multi-sector approach. Some attempts in that directions 
have been made (Cimoli 1988; Dosi et al. 1990; Cimoli and Soete 
1992; Verspagen 1993).  As for Dixon-Thirlwall type models the 
growth paths generated by these multi-sector models are highly 
dependent on structural features. In an international context, this 
may be consistent with lasting differences in growth rates (lock -in 
effects). Similar results have been reached by Lucas (1988, 1993), 
                     
10  McCombie  and  Thirlwall  (1994)  argue  that  the  predictive  power  of  this  model 
depends  on  the  inclusion  of  J apan,  i.e.,  that  while  the  model  may  explain  the 
(large) difference in performance between J apan and other industrialized countries, 
it has little to say about the (much smaller) differences among the latter.  
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albeit via a more neoclassical route. The Lucas model combines 
assumptions (a) and (b) above with the assumption of differences 
in  comparative  advantages  across  countries.  In  this  model, 
endogenous technological progress reinforces existing comparative 
advantages. Thus, a country that happens to be specialized in a 
high-learning activity, will stay so and, as a consequence, grow 
permanently faster than other countries. An implication of this 
is  that  it  may  make  sense  for  a  government  to  intervene  in  the  economy 
in  order  to  change  its  pattern  of  specialization  (towards 
high-learning activities).  
 
New Growth Theory 
 
The  view  that  the  handling  of  technology  in  the  traditional 
neoclassical theory of economic growth is problematic, has gained 
support  in  recent  years.  Indeed,  for  this  very  reason,  neoclassical 
growth theory is now rapidly changing. Basically, there are two 
different  perspectives  on  the  relation  between  technology  and 
growth in the "new neoclassical" camp.
11 Following Arrow's (1962) 
analysis of "learning by doing", Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and 
others have developed models in which growth in new knowledge is 
analysed as a by -product (externality) of other economic activities 
(investments in physical and hum an capital). A similar perspective, 
although  distinctly  non -neoclassical  in  character,  has  been 
                     
11  We  do  not  attempt  to  review  these  theories  here,  just  emphasize  some  main 
points that appear to be important in the present context. For overviews/ reviews of 
this literature the reader may consult Helpman (1992), Renelt (1991), Shaw (1992), 
Siebert (1991), van der Ploeg and Tang (1992) or Verspagen (1992).    
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presented  by  Scott  (1989).  This  type  of  model  suggests  an 
explanation of why "catch-up" does not take place in many cases. 
In  Solow's  model,  the  rate  of  profit  (and,  hence,  the  rate  of  growth) 
is a decreasing function of the capital-labour ratio. However, if 
there  are  positive  external  effects  of  physical  and/or  human 
capital, these may outweigh the negative effects on profitability 
and, hence, growth of an increasing capital-labour ratio. Thus, 
due to the positive external effects of capital, rich countries 
may stay rich, while poor countries continue to be poor. 
  Another, although related, approach may be found in Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
others. In these models, innovation (the introduction of new goods 
or  production  methods)  occurs  because  firms  are  capable  of 
preventing a situation in which the new knowledge diffuses so 
quickly that they can not cover their initial outlays. There is, 
in other words, imperfect competition. However, in addition to the 
private,  proprietary  competent, innovation  also has a public 
component  ("technological  spill-overs")  that  facilitates 
subsequent  innovation  projects.  This  prevents  the  returns  to 
investments  in  innovation activity to decline. Thus, it is the dual 
public-private character of the innovation process  
that allows growth to go on in these models. A typical result is 
that the rate of growth is proportional to the amount of resources 
devoted to innovation. If a country allocates very little of its 
resources to innovation, for instance because the country is very 
poor, the result may be no (or low) growth.  
  The  implications  of  new  growth  theory  for  differences  in  growth  
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and  welfare  across  countries  that  trade  with  each  other,  are 
discussed in detail by Grossman and Helpman (1991). They place the 
ideas  outlined  above  in  a  traditional  neoclassical  general 
equilibrium  setting.  As  is  common  in  this  literature,  the  population 
of  each  country  is  assumed  to  be  represented  by  one  "representative" 
consumer  that  maximizes utility over an infinite horizon. The 
subjective  discount  rate  is  assumed  to  be  the  same  in  all  countries. 
If technological spill-overs (i.e., diffusion) are international 
rather than national in character, and a "perfect" international 
capital market prevails, consumers in all countries tend to be 
equally  well  off  in  terms  of  welfare,  although  there  may  be 
differences  in  the  growth  of  output.  However,  when  these  assumptions 
are relaxed, the possibilities for diverging patterns increase. 
In these cases "lock-in" situations may occur, in which case a 
country with a comparative advantage in traditional industries may 
be permanently worse off compared to a country with a comparative 
advantage  in  R&D. According to these models a small domestic market 
may also be a considerable disadvantage for a country under such 
circumstances. 
 
The Recent Surge of Empirical Work 
 
In recent years many new empirical studies on growth differences 
have appeared. To a large extent this is a reflection of the 
"catch-up" debate and the development of the "new growth theory", 
but  it  is  also  a  result  of  easier  access  to  data  (Summers  and  Heston 
1991) and, probably, the introduction of econometric programs for  
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the PC. In general, the research in this area may be characterized 
as  highly  explorative.  However,  although  the  theoretical 
perspectives  of  the  authors  of  these  studies  may  differ,  the 
empirical models are rather similar.  The variables taken into 
account in these studies may be divided into three groups: 
(i) GDP per capita, as a proxy for the scope for "catch-up"; 
(ii) Variables reflecting attempts to affect the "gap", such as 
investment, education and resources devoted to - or output from 
 - innovation activities;  
(iii)  Other  variables  of  a  "structural"  or  political  nature  assumed 
to affect growth (such as the degree of openness to trade, country 
size, share of public sector in GDP, population growth etc.). 
  The samples in these studies vary from rather small ones, 
including  the  OECD countries  only,  or - alternatively - a selection 
of less developed countries, to very large samples including both 
developed and developing countries. In general, the quality of the 
data is worse for poorer countries. For many poor countries the 
data are pure estimates. This implies that the results from tests 
including  such  estimated  (low  quality)  data  may  be  biased.  However, 
it has been shown (Blomström et al. 1992; Levine and Renelt 1992) 
that the inclusion of such low-quality data does not significantly 
influence the results.  
  The  following  appears  to  be  some  of  the  most  important 
conclusions  that  can be drawn from the empirical literature in this 
area: 
(1)  General  support  is  found  for  models  where  the  scope  for 
"catch-up" is combined with some other variable(s) reflecting the  
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"efforts" to close the gap. The fact that convergence in income 
levels appears to have slowed down after 1973 (Abramowitz 1986), 
does not necessarily invalidate this result (Dowrick and Nguyen 
1989). 
(2) The two "efforts" variables most commonly used are investments 
and education. The positive impact of the investments variable is 
generally  supported.
12  The  main  disagreement  -  on  which  no 
conclusive evidence exists - has been to what extent investment 
should be regarded as exogenous, as suggested by Solow, or 
endogenous as advocated by some new growth theorists. Education 
variables work fine for the less developed countries, or large 
samples containing both developed and less developed countries, 
but not for samples where all non-OECD countries are excluded. 
Probably, education variables  - such as literacy rates or the 
percentage of population enroled in schools  - are much too "rough" 
to reflect differences in "social capability" and/or innovative 
efforts between developed countries. There are only a few studies 
that include innovation variables (R&D, patents, scientists and 
engineers etc.). In small, high -income samples innovation var iables 
have been shown to contribute positively to the explanation of 
differences in growth across countries. This also applies when NIC 
countries are included. A recent study (Lichtenberg 1992) includes 
data for more than fifty countries. This study sugge sts a strong 
                     
12  De  Long  and  Summers  (1991)  report  that  the  impact  of  investments  in 
equipment is far greater than investments in structures. Their results also indicate 
that the social returns to equipment investments exceed the private returns by a 
sizeable  amount.  However,  these  results  are  not  confirmed  by  Wolff  (1994),  who 
attributes the De Long-Summers findings to a neglect of capital-embodied catching 
up.  Most  other  studies  also  conclude  that  the  social  and  private  returns  to 
investments in physical capital are abou t the same.    
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positive  impact  of  R&D  -  especially  when  privately  funded  -  on  levels 
and growth of productivity. 
(3)  The  evidence  on  the  impact  of  variables  other  than  those  related 
to  technology  gaps  and  "efforts"  is  rather  mixed.  Levine  and  Renelt 
(1992), in a sensitivity analysis of the impact of policy-related 
variables, found that none of them were "robustly" correlated with 
growth. A "non-robust" relationship means that the impact of the 
variable was found to be sensitive to the inclusion of (some) other 
variables. This does not necessarily imply that the variable under 
test is unimportant for growth. For instance, the finding may be 
explained by the fact that variables are closely correlated, as 
economic variables often are (see below). 
(4)  The  results  indicate  there  is  a  good  deal  of  interaction  between 
variables that take part in the growth process. For instance, when 
both investments and education are included, the impact of each 
variable,  especially  education,  is  reduced.  This  is  not  necessarily 
surprising, since these two variables tend to be correlated (Barro 
1991). Thus, generally speaking, countries do not invest in either 
education or physical capital, they invest in both. A similar 
finding holds for "openness", which in contrast to common belief 
was not found to be "robustly" correlated growth.
13 There was, 
however, a robust correlation between investment and "openness", 
                     
13  This is also confirmed by a number of other studies (see Fagerberg 1994, Table 
2).  An  exception  is  the  study  by  Edwards  (1992).  Following  Leamer  (1988), 
Edwards defines openness as the difference between the actual and predicted level 
of trade (using a prediction model based on neoclassical trade theory). Since this 
definition differs from those used elsewhere, the reported results are not directly 
comparable.  However,  Levine  and  Renelt  (1992),  using  the  same  definition  of 
openness as Edwards, found that openness (so defined) is not robustly correlated 
with growth, while - as for other measures of openness - a robust correlation with 
investment seems to exist.  
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i.e., countries that trade much, compared to their size (GDP), 
invest more than others.  
  These are some of the "stylized facts" that emerge from the 
empirical  literature.  There  is  some  support  here  for  a  Schumpeterian 
approach to the "catch-up" process. But many of the findings can 
also  be  interpreted  as  consistent  with  other  theories  in  this area, 
including, for instance, an extended neoclassical growth model, 
incorporating human capital (Mankiw et al. 1992). Thus, it is 
difficult to use the results from these studies to discriminate 
among the different theories in this field. Indeed, many of the 
tested models in the empirical literature look very much like 
reduced-form  equations.  Since  different  systems  may  share  identical 
reduced  forms,  it  is  not  surprising  that  it  is  difficult  to 
discriminate  between  the  conflicting  views.  Probably,  the 
estimation of a single-equation model - with GDP per capita and 
other variables included - is an activity to which there are now 
sharply diminishing returns. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
   
As demonstrated in this paper, a convergence between orthodox and 
non-orthodox views on the importance of technology for economic 
growth has to some extent taken place. Increasingly, innovation 
and diffusion of technology are now acknowledged as the major 
factors in growth processes, not only by Schumpeterians and other 
heterodox economists, but by many neoclassicals as well. However, 
important  differences  remain  between  the  competing  views,  both  with  
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respect to how technology, firms and other agents are conceived 
and what the policy implications are. But, as this paper shows, 
the recent empirical work in this area is not able to discriminate 
between the competing views, and thus is of little help when it 
comes to policy advice. Still, when the many individual studies 
are put together, one message comes through quite clearly: The 
potential  for  "catch-up"  (imitation)  is  there,  but  is  only  realized 
by countries that have a sufficiently strong "social capability", 
e.g.,  those  that  manage  to  mobilize  the  necessary  resources 
(investments, education, R&D etc.). Thus, real world "catch-up" 
is far from the easy, smooth process envisaged by traditional 
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